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BAR BRIEFS
not act arbitrarily or unreasonably. An absolue requirement that
stock trains maintain an average speed of twenty miles an hour
when transporting stock is not reasonable since it does not make
allowance for wrecks, weather, or other unforseeable causes of
delay. Downey v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 19 N. D. 621, 125 N. W.
475, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1017 (1910). The right of the state to
regulate the liquor traffic in the interests of the public health
and morals is thus stated by Christanson, J.: "The basic principle
which underlies all legislation relative to the liquor traffic is that
the traffic is one which the state may regulate or prohibit in the
interests of public morality and welfare." State ex rel. Germain
v. Ross, 39 N. D. 630, 637, 170 N. W. 121, 124 (1918). And a
statute defining intoxicating liquor as any beverage retaining
the "alcoholic principle" did not make a state law prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of such beverage unconstitutional under
Section 1, because the sale of such liquors, even though not in-
toxicating in the popular sense, would render the problem of
enforcement more difficult. State v. Fargo Bottling Works Co.,
19 N. D. 396, 124 N. W. 387, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 872 (1910).
(Continued Next Issue)
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF FRANK NOVAK DECEASED
In Ludmila Novak, Pet. and Applt. vs. Robert Novak, Emilie Lane,
Henry Novak, and Franklin D. Tonne, as Executor of the Last Will, Testa-
ment and Estate of the above named Frank Novak, Respt. Robert Novak,
Emilie Lane, Henry Novak, Applts.
That upon an appeal by an executor of an estate from an order of
the county court determining the amount of the commission to be paid
to him by said estate, the failure to file and serve an undertaking on
appeal does not prevent the jurisdiction of the district court from attaching.
That where an executor appeals from an order of the county court
fixing the amount of commission to be paid him by the estate of which
he is the executor, and the notice of appeal conforms to the requirements
of the statute, the district court has jurisdiction to remand the record
to the county court in order to permit the executor to apply to that court
for an order settling the amount of undertaking on appeal. In this case
it is not determined whether such undertaking on appeal was necessary
when the executor had furnished a bond as executor of the estate.
That where the sole issue on said appeal is the amount of the commission
to which the executor is entitled, it is held: The district court did not
err in determining the amount of commission to be paid by the estate,
so the amount allowed was within the limits set by Section 8822
of the Comp. Laws.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court, Richland County, Hon.
W. H. Hutchinson, Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr.J.
In State of North Dakota, ex rel, Mary Kusie, Pltf., and Respt., vs.
L. E. Weber, Deft. and Applt.
That under the provisions of Sec. 396 all of Supp., which authorizes
the workmen's compensation bureau to make an award against a delin-
quen-t employer, engaged in a hazardous business, in favor of an em-
ployee injured in the course of his employment, the injured person has
the burden of proving he was an employee at the time he received the
injury and that the injury was received in the course of the employment.
BAR BRIEFS
That our law does not limit compensable injuries to those arising
out of the employment. If the worker is an employee, injured in the
course of employment, he is entitled to an award.
That the term "employee," as defined by Sec. 396a2 of the Supp.,
includes every person engaged in a hazardous employment (as that term
is defined by statute) under any contract of hire, express or implied,
oral or written, but excluding one whose employment is casual and not
in the course of business of the employer.
That to be "engaged in employment" means more than being hired
to commence work. It means being set to work, discharging duties for
the employer under the terms of the contract of hire, doing a duty he
is employed to do.
That one who has made his contract of hire, but who has never
worked thereunder nor commenced work under such contract is not an
"employee engaged in employment" as contemplated by the workmen's
compensation act; and is not entitled to an award against the employer
under the provisions of Sec. 396all of the Supp., even though injured in
preparing to begin work.
Appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Stark County,
Hon. H. L. Berry, Judge.
REVERSED. Opinion of the court by Burr, J.
In A. E. Roethke, Pltf. and Respt. vs. North Dakota Taxpayers
Association, Inc., a Corporation; John Conrad, John Dawson, R. D. Ward,
W. H. Ladell, Bennett Nerby, Oscar Herum, C. A. Williams, J. M. Cath-
chart, J. B. McWethy; Cass County Taxpayers Association; John Runck,
C. A. Williams, W. H. Kyser, T. F. Powers, R. S. Lewis, William Veitch,
J. M. Cathcart, and Fryne L. Williams, Deft. and Applts.
That a demurrer to a complaint does not reach mere uncertainty nor
a defective statement of facts, when sufficient facts are well pleaded.
That a demurer admits the truth of all issuable, relevant and material
facts well pleaded; including allegations of falsity, publication, and malice
in an action for libel.
That a demurer to a complaint, based on the ground that it does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is properly overruled
though some allegations are not properly pleaded, when other allegations
therein contained are good and sufficient.
Appeal from an order of the District Court of Cass County, Hon.
Daniel B. Holt, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.
In R. W. Henderson, Pltf. and Res. vs. W. B. Scott an dWorkmen's
Compensation Bureau ,et al, Def. and Appts.
That the fact that claimant to compensation who has a right to share
in the workmen's compensation fund, is entitled to have the bureau fur-
nish him with necessary medical services does not relieve him from lia-
bility for the reasonable value of the services rendered him by a physician
employed by himself and the bureau, the claimant being liable to the
physician 'because of his own contract.
That a physician may not maintain an action against the workmen's
compensation bureau to recover for the value of services he rendered
to one entitled to share in workmen's compensation bureau, as the bureau
is not a legal entity subject to suit. Watland et al v. Bureau, 58 N. D.
303, 225 N. W. 812 followed.
Appeal from orders of the district court of Burleigh County, over-
ruling demurrers. Hon. Fred Jansonius, Judge. AFFIRMED in part and
REVERSED in part. Opinion of the Court by, Burr, J.
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In International Shoe Company, a corporation, Pltf. and Applt. vs.
Rika A. Hawkinson, et al., Def. and Res.
That Section 2 of chapter 189, Laws N. D. 1929, which provides that
in a civil action or proceeding by or against executors, administrators,
etc., in which judgment may be entered for or against them, neither
party shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any transaction
whatever with or statement by the testator or intestate, does not render
a party incompetent to testify to transactions with a partnership of which
the deceased was alleged to have been a member where the transactions
were had directly with other partners.
That an admission made by a person, in his testimony in an action
or proceeding, is after his deathe competent evidence in a subsequent
proceeding against his personal representative and the court reporter who
heard and recorded the testimony is competent to testify to the state-
ment made by the deceased.
That testimony as to the details of correspondence with a deceased
person, including the mailing and receipt of letters constitutes testimony
as to transactions with the deceased within the meaning of section 2,
chapter 189 Laws 1929.
That Section 2 of chap, 189, S. L. 1929, does not render the personal
representative of a deceased person incompetent to testify in an action
in which such representative is a party when the representative is called
upon to testify by an adverse party. APPEAL from the District Court
of Cass County, Holt, J. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J. Nuessle,
J. concurring. REVERSED and new trial granted.
In Harry Delaloye, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Ed. Kaisershot and Mrs.
E. Kaisershot, Deft. and Applt.s.
That while the statute governing the operation of automobiles on
the public highway requires the driver of a vehicle, intending to turn
from a direct line, to give a signal of intention to turn so that the driver
of another vehicle may be made aware of the intention, the failure
to give such signal does not in itself entitle the driver of the second
vehicle to recover damage because of a collision if he is driving at an
excessive speed and this was a proximate cause of the collision.
That where two cars are approaching an intersection of highways
at approximately the same time, ordinarily the law requires the driver
of the vehicle on the left to yield the right of way to the driver of the
vehicle on the right, and though one of these highways is an arterial
highway so that the driver thereon is entitled to the right of way as a
matter of right, such right of way is limited to cases where both vehicles
are entering the intersection at approximately the same time. Where
one driver, not ordinarily entitled to the right of way, enters the inter-
section safely so as to precede the other car, the fact that the latter
car may have been entitled to the right of way does not relieve the
driver thereof from the ordinary rules governing traffic. The right known
as right of way establishes precedence only when rights might be other-
wise evently balanced.
That in an action for damages because of a collision between two
automobiles, where the plaintiff charged the collision was caused soley
by the negligence of the defendant and the defendant charged the col-
lision was caused solely by the negligence of the plaintiff, and testimony
was introduced in support of the theory of each, it is held: That where
the charge to the jury on the question of failure to give a signal when
turning from a direct line, on contributory negligence, and on the effect
of the negligence of the plaintiff must have been confusing to the jury in
the light of the issues involved, so as to effect the rights of appellants
adversely, a new trial should have ibeen granted.
Appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff and from an order
denying a new trial, District Court, Stark County, Hon. Harvey J. Miller,
Judg. REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J. Burke and Chris-
tianson, JJ. concur specially.
